by A APPADURAI · Cited by 11836 — Introduction: commodities and the politics of value. ARJUN APPADU RA I. This essay has two aims. The first is to preview and set the context for essays
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction: commodities and the politics of value ARJUN APPADU RA I This essay has two aims. The first is to preview and set the context for the essays that follow it in this volume. The second is to propose a new perspective on the circulation of commodities in social life. The gist of this perspective can be put in the following way. Economic exchange creates value. Value is embodied in commodities that are exchanged. Focusing on the things that are exchanged, rather than simply on the forms or functions of exchange, makes it possible to argue that what creates the link between exchange and value is politics, construed broadly. This argument, which is elaborated in the text of this essay, justifies the conceit that commodities, like persons, have social lives. J Commodities can provisionally be defined as objects of economic value. As to what we ought to mean by economic value, the most useful (though not quite standard) guide is Georg Simmel. In the first chapter of The Philosophy of Money (1907; English translation, 1978), Simmel provides a systematic account of how economic value is best defined. Value, for Simmel, is never an inherent property of objects, but is a judgment made about them by subjects. Yet the key to the comprehension of value, according to Simmei, lies in a region where “that subjectivity is only provisional and actually not very essential” (Simmel 1978:73). In exploring this difficult realm, which is neither wholly subjective nor quite objective, in which value emerges and functions, Simmel suggests that objects are not difficult to acquire because they uable, “but we call those objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them” (p. 67). What Simmel calls economic objects, in ular, exist in the space between pure desire and immediate enjoyment, with some distance between them and the person who desires them, which is a distance that can be overcome. This distance is overcome in and through economic exchange, in which the value of objects is determined reciprocally. That is, one’s desire for an object is fulfilled by the sacrifice of some other object, which is the focus of the desire of another. Such exchange of sacrifices is what economic life is all 3
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4 Arjun Appadurai about and the economy as a particular social form “consists not only in exchanging values but in the exchange of values” (p. 80). Economic value, for Simmel, is generated by this sort of exchange of sacrifices. Several arguments follow this analysis ofeconomic value in Simmel’s discussion. The first is that economic value is notjust value in general, but a definite sum of value, which results from the commensuration of two intensities of demand. The form this commensuration takes is the exchange of sacrifice and gain. Thus, the economic object does not have an absolute value as a result of the demand for it, but the demand, as the basis of a real or imagined exchange, endows the object with value. It is exchange that sets the parameters of utility and scarcity, rather than the other way round, and exchange that is the source of value: “The difficulty ofacquisition, the sacrifice offered in exchange, is the unique constitutive element of value, of which scarcity is only the external manifestation, its objectification in the form of quantity” (p. 100). In a word, exchange is not a by-product of the mutual valuation of objects, but its source. These terse and brilliant observations set the stage for Simmel’s analysis of what he regarded as the most complex instrument for the conduct ofeconomic exchange -money -and its place in modern life. But Simmel’s observations can be taken in quite another direction. This alternative direction, which is exemplified by the remainder of this essay, entails exploring the conditions under which economic objects circulate in different regimes of value in space and time. Many of the essays in this volume examine specific things (or groups of things) as they circulate in specific cultural and historical milieus. What these essays permit is a series of glimpses of the ways in which desire and demand, reciprocal sacrifice and power interact to create nomic value in specific social situations. Contemporary Western common sense, building on various ical traditions in philosophy, law, and natural science, has a strong , tendency to oppose “words” and “things.” Though this was not always the’ case even in the West, as Marcel Mauss noted in his famous work The Gift, the powerful contempmary tendency is to regard the world of things as inert and mute, set’ in motion and animated, indeed knowable, only by persons and their words (see also Dumont 30). Yet, in many historical societies, things have not been so divorced from the capacity of persons to act and the power of words to municate (see Chapter 2). That such a view of things had not appeared even under the conditions ofoccidental industrial capitalism is one of the intuitions that underlay Marx’s famous discussion, in Capital, of the “fetishism of commodities.” Introduction: commodities Even if our own approach to the view that things have no mea transactions, attributions, and m( thropological problem is that th the concrete, historical circulation the things themselves, for their m their uses, their trajectories. It trajectories that we can interpret lations that enliven things. Thus, of view human actors encode th odological point of view it is the tr human and social context. No sc analyst is an economist, an art 1 avoid a minimum level of what tishism. This·methodological things themselves, is in part a cor: sociologize transactions in thing: Firth has recently noted (l983:8c Commodities, and things in gel several kinds ofanthropology. Tl the last resort ofarcheologists. Th which unites archeologists with : ogists. As valuables, they are at t and, not least, as the medium ( exchange theory and social anthl perspective on things represents vived, semiotically oriented inter marked and exemplified in a sp’ But commodities are not of fune ogists. They also ,constitute a tc economic historians, to art histo: mists, though each discipline mig] Commodities thus represent a s have something to offer to its ne about which it has a good deal t( The essays in this volume covel conceptual ground, but they do tionship of culture to commodit anthropologists, an archeologist, omists or art historians are repn: by no means ignored. Several m;: (notably China and Latin Americ
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I articular social form “consists not only exchange of values” (p. 80). Economic 1 by this sort of exchange of sacrifices. s analysis ofeconomic value in Simmel’s nomic value is notjust value in general, hich results from the commensuration fhe form this commensuration takes is gain. Thus, the economic object does a result of the demand for it, but the II or imagined exchange, endows the 1ge that sets the parameters of utility Ither way round, and exchange that is ulty of acquisition, the sacrifice offered Institutive element of value, of which lanifestation, its objectification in the a word, exchange is not a by-product ects, but its source. .servations set the stage for Simmers ; the most complex instrument for the -money -and its place in modern life. be taken in quite another direction. ch is exemplified by the remainder of le conditions under which economic gimes of value in space and time. Many :xamine specific things (or groups of fic cultural and historical milieus. What ,f glimpses of the ways in which desire ice and power interact to create ltuations. mon sense, building on various aw, and natural science, has a strong :i “things.” Though this was not always arcel Mauss noted in his famous work lorary tendency is to regard the world set in motion and animated, indeed heir words (see also Dumont eties, things have not been so divorced ) act and the power of words to It such a view of things had not ofoccidental industrial capitalism nderlay Marx’s famous discussion, in nmodities.” Introduction: commodities and the politics of value 5 Even if our own approach to things is conditioned necessarily by the view that things have no meanings apart from those that human transactions, attributions, and motivations endow them with, the thropological problem is that this formal truth does not illuminate the concrete, historical circulation of things. For that we have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories. It is only through the analysis of these trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions and lations that enliven things. Thus, even though from a theoretical point of view human actors encode things with significance, from a odological point of view it is the things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social context. No social analysis of things (whether the analyst is an economist, an art historian, or an anthropologist) can avoid a minimum level of what might be called methodological tishism. This’methodological fetishism, returning our attention to the things themselves, is in part a corrective to the tendency to excessively sociologize transactions in things, a tendency we owe to Mauss, as Firth has recently noted (1983:89).2 Commodities, and things in general, are of independent interest to several kinds ofanthropology. They constitute the first principles and the last resort ofarcheologists. They are the stuffof”material culture,” which unites archeologists with several kinds of cultural ogists. As valuables, they are at the heart of economic anthropology and, not least, as the medium of gifting, they are at the heart of exchange theory and social anthropology generally. The commodity perspective on things represents a valuable point of entry to the vived, semioticaHy oriented interest in material culture, recently marked and exemplified in a special section of RAIN (Miller 1983). But commodities are not of fundamental interest only to ogists. They also constitute a topic of lively interest to social and. economic historians, to art historians, and, lest we forget, to mists, though each discipline might constitute the problem differently. Commodities thus represent a subject on which anthropol()gy may have something to offer to its neighboring disciplines, as we’ll as one about which it has a good deal to learn from them. The essays in this volume cover much historical, ethnographic, and conceptual ground, but they do not by any means exhaust the tionship of culture to commodities. The contributors are five social anthropologists, an archeologist, and four social historians. No omists or art historians are represented here, though their views are by no means ignored. Several major world areas are not represented (notably China and Latin America), but the spatial coverage is
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6 Arjun Appadurai theless fairly wide. Though an interesting range of goods is discussed in these essays, the list of commodities not discussed would be quite long, and there is a tilt toward specialized or luxury goods rather than “primary” or “bulk” commodities. Finally, most of the contributors stick to goods rather than to services, though the latter are obviously important objects of commoditization as welL Though each of these omissions is serious, I shall suggest in the course of this essay that some of them are less important than they might seem. The remaining five sections of this essay are devoted to the following tasks. The first, on the spirit of commodity, is a critical exercise in definition, whose argument is that commodities, properly understood, are not the monopoly of modern, industrial economies. The next, on paths and diversions, discusses the strategies (both individual and institutional) that make the creation of value a politically mediated process. The subsequent section, on desire and demand, links and long-term patterns in commodity circulation to show that sumption is subject to social control and political redefinition. The last substantive section, on the relationship between knowledge and commodities, is concerned with demonstrating that the politics of value is in many contexts a politics of knowledge. The concluding section brings the argument back to politics as the mediating level between exchange and value. The spirit of the commodity Few will deny that a commodity is a thoroughly socialized thing. The definitional question is: in what does its sociality consist? The purist answer, routinely attributed to Marx, is that a commodity is a product intended principally for exchange, and that such products emerge, by definition, in the institutional, psychological, and economic ditions of capitalism. Less purist definitions regard commodities as goods intended for exchange, regardless of the form of the exchange. The purist definition forecloses the question prematurely. The looser definitions threaten to equate commodity with gift and many other kinds of thing. In this section, through a critique of the Marxian understanding of the commodity, I shall suggest that commodities are things with a particular type of social potential, that they are distinguishable from “products,” “objects,” “goods,” “artifacts,” and other sorts of things -but only in certain respects and from a certain point of view. If my argument holds water, it will follow that it is definitionally useful to regard commodities as existing in a very wide variety of societies (though with a special intensity and salience in Introduction: commodities all modern, capitalist societies), and th gence between Marx and Simmel c The most elaborate and thought of the commodity appears in Vol though the idea was widespread in political economy. Marx’s own rean was a central part of his critique 0 a fulcrum for the transition from cially Marx 1973) on capitalism to ‘ Today, the conceptual centrality 0 way to the neoclassical, marginali! word “commodity” is used in neo( a special subclass of primary goo analytic role. This is, of course, not in economics and sociology, or wil as those of Piero Sraffa), where plays a central theoretical role (Sr But in most mode.rn analyses 0 the meaning of the term com modi part of the heritage of Marx and is, in most contemporary uses, cor ufactured goods (or services), whit modes of production and are thtl! has penetrated. Thus even in cun ization (see, for example, Perlin 1 modi ties are associated with organizational and technical forms of European origin. Commoditie terial representations of the cap they are classified as petty and th Yet it is cle,ar that this is to dra’ understanding of the nature of t1 commodity in the first hundred c of the most difficult, contradictc corpus. It begins with an extren (“A commodity is, in the first pia by its properties satisfies human then moves dialectically through initions, which permit the gradl approach to use value and exch lence, the circulation and exchar of money, It is the elaboration 0
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7 .n interesting range of goods is discussed mmodities not discussed would be quite :I specialized or luxury goods rather than dities. Finally, most of the contributors services, though the latter are obviously ditization as well. Though each of these suggest in the course of this essay that tant than they might seem. ;of this essay are devoted to the following t of commodity, is a critical exercise in ;that commodities, properly understood, lern, industrial economies. The next, on ;ses the strategies (both individual and creation of value a politically mediated .ion, on desire and demand, links )mmodity circulation to show that con-control and political redefinition. The le relationship between knowledge and N’ith demonstrating that the politics of politics of knowledge. The concluding back to politics as the mediating level Ilmodity ity is a thoroughly socialized thing. The lat does its sociality consist? The purist o Marx, is that a commodity is a product lange, and that such products emerge, ::mal, psychological, and economic lrist definitions regard commodities as regardless of the form of the exchange. es the question prematurely. The looser e commodity with gift and many other m, through a critique of the Marxian )dity, I shall suggest that commodities type of social potential, that they are :ts,” “objects,” “goods,” “artifacts,” and Iy in certain respects and from a certain holds water, it will follow that it is I commodities as existing in a very wide N’ith a special intensity and salience in Introduction: commodities and the politics of value modern, capitalist societies), and that there is an unexpected gence between Marx and Simmel on the topic of commodities. The most elaborate and thought-provoking discussion of the idea of the commodity appears in Volume 1, Part I, of Marx’s Capital, though the idea was widespread in nin:teenth-century discussions .of political economy. Marx’s own reanalysIs of the concept of commodIty was a central part of his critique of bourgeois political economy and a fulcrum for the transition from his own earlier thought (see cially Marx 1973) on capitalism to the full-fledged analysis of Capital. Today, the conceptual centrality of the idea of commodity has given way to the neoclassical, marginalist conception of “goods,” and the word “commodity” is used in neoclassical economics only to refer to a special .of primary goods and no. longer plays a central analytic role. ThiS IS, of course, not the case wIth MarXian approaches in economics and sociology, or with neo-Ricardian approaches (such as those of Piero Sraffa), where the analysis of the “commodity” still plays a central theoretical role (Sraffa 1961; Sedd?n 1978). But in most modern analyses of economy (outSIde anthropology), the meaning of the term commodity has narrowed to reflect only one part of the heritage of Marx and the political That is, in most contemporary uses, commoditIes are speCIal kmds of ufactured goods (or services), which are associated only with capitalist modes of production and are thus to be found only where capitalism has penetrated. Thus even in current debates about ization (see, for example, Perlin 1982), the issue is not whether modities are associated with capitalism, but whether certain organizational arid technical forms associated with capitalism a:e solely of European origin. Commodities are generally seen as typICal terial representations of the capitalist mode of production, even if they are classified as petty and their capitalist context as incipient. Yet it is clear that this is to draw on only one strand in Marx’s own understanding of the nature of the commodity. The treatment of the commodity in the first hundred or so pages of Capital is arguably one of the most difficult, contradictory, and ambiguous parts of Marx’s corpus. It begins with an extremely broad definition of commodity (“A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another”). It then moves dialectically through a series of more parsimonious initions, which permit the gradual elaboration of the basic Marxian approach to use value and exchange value, the problem of lence, the circulation and exchange of products, and the significance of money. It is the elaboration of this understanding of the
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‘rm and the money form that allows tion between two forms of circulation oney-Commodities and esenting the general formula for tic movement, commodities become ersonal market, and exchange value. .ation (tied to use value), commodities nsuration capabilities of money. 1modities to postindustrial social, aken for granted, even by those who lrx seriously. lere is the basis for a much broader, :ally useful approach to commodities, on as he becomes embroiled in the nth-century industrial capitalism. By r to produce not mere products but uce use values for others, social use was glossed by Engels in a in the following interesting way: :fuct must be transferred to another, e, by means of an exchange” (Marx content with this elucidation, Marx 😡 (and ambiguous) series of nodities, but for anthropological quotation in full: ites of society, a use-value; but it is only dety’s development that such a product )()ch when the labour spent on the xpressed as one of the objective qualities refore follows that the elementary der which a product of labour appears lat the gradual transformation of such s pari passu with the development of the g the logical aspect of this argument noted by Anne Chapman (1980), , shortly. In the above passage from Łcommodity is discussed historically. chematic, and it is difficult to specify ill imprisoned in two aspects of the one could see the economy only in Introdnction: commodities and the politics of valne 9 C rence to the problematics of production (Baudrillard 1975); the rele d’ d’ I h r regarded the movement to commo Ity pro uctlon as evo ot e d” ‘h’ ry unidirectional and historical. As a result commo Itles elt ertiona ” ,exist or do not exist, and they are products of a partICular sort. Each of these assumptions requires modification. .. Despite these epistemic limitations, in his famous diScussion of fetishism of commodities, Marx does note, as he does elsewhere In Capital, that the commodity does not emerge wh?le-cloth from producL under bourgeois but makes Its at an early date in history, though not 10 the same predommatmg characteristic manner as nowadays.” (Marx 1971 :86). Though It IS outside the scope of this essay to explore the difficulties of own thought on precapitalist, nonstate, nonmonetary economies, we might note that Marx .t?e door open for the of modities, at least in a pnmltlve form, 10 many sorts of socIety. The definitional strategy 1 propose is a return to a version of gels’s emendation of Marx’s broad definition involving the production of use value for others, which converges with SimmeI’s emphasis on exchange as the source of economic value, Let us with the idea that a commodity is any thing intended for exchange. This gets us away from the exclusive preoccupation with the “product,” and the original or dominant intention of the “producer” and permits us to focus on the dynamics of exchange. For comparative purposes, then, the question becomes not “What is a commodity?” but rather “What sort of an exchange is commodity exchange?” Here, and as part of the effort to define commodities,better, we need to with two kinds of exchange that are conventionally contrasted wIth modity exchange. The first is barter referred to as exchange), and the other is the exchange of gifts. Let us start with barter. Barter as a form of exchange has recently been analyzed by man (1980) in an essay that, among other things, takes issue with Marx’s own analysis of the relationship between direct exchange an? commodity exchange. Combining aspects of several current tions of barter (including Chapman’s), I would suggest that barter IS the exchange of objects for one another without reference to money and with maximum feasible reduction of social, cultural, political, or personal transaction costs. The former criterion distinguishes barter from commodity exchange in the strict Marxist sense, and the latter from gift exchange by virtually any definition. . Chapman is right that, insofar as Marx’s theory of value IS taken seriously, his treatment of barter poses insoluble theoretical and
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10 Arjun Appadurai ceptual problems (Chapman 1980:68-70), for Marx postulated that barter took the form of direct exchange of the product (x use value A = Y use value B), as well as direct exchange of the commodity (x commodity A y commodity B). But this Marxist view of barter, whatever problems it may pose for a Marxist theory of the origin of value, has the virtue of fitting well with Chapman’s most persuasive claim -that barter, as either a dominant or a subordinate form of exchange, exists in an extremely wide range of societies. Chapman criticizes Marx for inserting the commodity into barter and wishes to keep them quite separate, on the grounds that commodities assume the use of money objects (and thus congealed labor value), and not just money as a unit of account or measure of equivalence. Commodity exchange, for Chapman, occurs only when a money object intervenes in exchange. Since barter, in her model, excludes such intervention, commodity exchange and barter are formally completely distinct, though they may coexist in some societies (Chapman 68). In her critique of Marx, it seems to me, Chapman takes an unduly constricted view of the role of money in the circulation of ities. Though Marx ran into difficulties in his own analysis of the relationship between barter and commodity exchange, he was right to see, as did Polanyi, that there was a commonality of spirit between barter and capitalist commodity exchange, a commonality tied (in this view) to the object-centered, relatively impersonal, asocial nature of each. In the various simple forms of barter, we see an effort to change things without the constraints of sociality on the one hand, and the complications of money on the other. Barter in the porary world is on the increase: one estimate has it that an estimated $12 billion a year in goods and services is bartered in the United States alone. International barter (Pepsico syrup for Russian vodka; Cola for Korean toothpicks and Bulgarian forklifts are examples) is also developing into a complex alternative economy. In these latter situations, barter is a response to the growing number of barriers to international trade and finance, and has a specific role to play in the larger economy. Barter, as a form of trade, thus links the exchange of commodities in widely different social, technological, and tional circumstances. Barter may thus be regarded as a special form of commodity exchange, one in which, for any variety ‘of reasons, money plays either no role or a very indirect role (as a mere unit of account). By this definition of barter, it would be difficult to locate any human society in which commodity exchange is completely relevant. Barter appears to be the form of commodity exchange in Introduction: commodities which the circulation of things is or cultural norms. Yet wherever nation of what may be bartered, as of what drives the demand for affair. There is a deep tendency largely negative matter, so that t earlier periods is frequently regal relation between communities rat! is, in this model, held to be in . foreign trade, by extension, is se (Sahlins 1972). But there are goo sons to question this view. The notion that trade in nonm generally regarded as antisocial f communities and thus was fre( strangers has as its close counte gift and that of the commodity a exchange and commodity exch; and mutually exclusive. Thougl recent attempts to mute the Mauss (Hart 1982; Tambiah 1£ modalities of exchange as fundal feature of anthropological discou gory 1982; Sahlins 1972; Taussi: The exaggeration and reificat commodity in anthropological wr are the tendency to romanticize value (in Marx’s sense) with ge tendency to forget that capitalisl cultural designs; the proclivity t( culative, impersonal and self-ag societies. These tendencies, in tUl view of the opposition between rv (1982) has suggested, misses im] between them. Gifts, and the spirit of recipr which they are typically exchang. profit-oriented, self-centered, ar culation of commodities. Furthe and embed the flow of things modi ties are held to represent cultural constraints -of goods f
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II 1980:68-70), for Marx postulated that ct exchange of the product (x use value 1S direct exchange of the commodity (x ty B). But this Marxist view of barter, )se for a Marxist theory of the origin of ue of fitting well with Chapman’s most r, as either a dominant or a subordinate an extremely wide range of societies. inserting the commodity into barter and )arate, on the grounds that commodities (and thus congealed labor value), : of account or measure of equivalence. apman, occurs only when a money object :e barter, in her model, excludes such lange and barter are formally completely cist in some societies (Chapman seems to me, Chapman takes an unduly )f money in the circulation of ) difficulties in his own analysis of the md commodity exchange, he was right here was a commonality of spirit between ity exchange, a commonality tied (in this relatively impersonal, asocial nature of :onns of barter, we see an effort to mstraints of sociality on the one hand, [ley on the other. Barter in the se: one estimate has it that an estimated f services is bartered in the United States Jepsico syrup for Russian vodka; md Bulgarian forklifts are examples) is lex alternative economy. In these latter ;e to the growing number of barriers to ce, and has a specific role to play in the form of trade, thus links the exchange ferent social, technological, and may thus be regarded as a special form in which, for any variety’of reasons, r a very indirect role (as a mere unit of )f barter, it would be difficult to locate commodity exchange is completely )e the form of commodity exchange in Introduction: commodities and the politics of value which the circulation of things is most divorced from social, political, or cultural norms. Yet wherever evidence is available, the nation of what may be bartered, where, when, and by whom, as well as of what drives the demand for the goods of the “other,” is a social affair. There is a deep tendency to regard this social regulation as a largely negativ<: matter, so that barter in sn:all-scale socie.ties and in earlier periods IS frequently regarded as havmg been restncted to the relation between communities rather than within communities. Barter is, in this model, held to be in inverse proportion to sociality, and foreign trade, by extension, is seen to have 'preceded' internal trade (Sahlins 1972). But there are good empirical and methodological sons to question this view. The notion that trade in nonmonetized, preindustrial economies is generally regarded as antisocial from the point of view of face-to-face communities and thus was frequently restricted to dealings with strangers has as its close counterpart the view that the spirit of the gift and that of the commodity are deeply opposed. In this view, gift exchange and commodity exchange are fundamentally contrastive and mutually exclusive. Though there have been some important recent attempts to mute the exaggerated contrast between Marx and Mauss (Hart 1982; Tambiah 1984), the tendency to see these two modalities of exchange as fundamentally opposed remains a marked feature of anthropological discourse (Dumont 1980; Hyde 1979; gory 1982; Sahlins 1972; Taussig 1980). The exaggeration and reification of the contrast between gift and commodity in anthropological writing has many sources. Among them are the tendency to romanticize small-scale societies; to conflate use value (in Marx's sense) with gemeinchaft (in Toennies's sense); the tendency to forget that capitalist societies, too, operate according to cultural designs; the proclivity to marginalize and underplay the culative, impersonal and self-aggrandizing features of noncapitalist societies. These tendencies, in turn, are a product of an oversimplified view of the opposition between Mauss and Marx, which, as Keith Hart (1982) has suggested, misses important aspects of the commonalities between them. Gifts, and the spirit of reciprocity, sociability, and spontaneity in which they are typically exchanged, usually are starkly opposed to the profit-oriented, self-centered, and calculated spirit that fires the culation of commodities. Further, where gifts link things to persons and embed the flow of things in the flow of social relations, modities are held to represent the drive -largely free of moral or cultural constraints -of goods for one another, a drive media'ted by
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12 Arjun Appadurai money and not by sociality. Many of the essays in this volume, as well as my own argument here, are designed to show that this is a simplified and overdrawn series of contrasts. For the present, though, let me propose one important quality that gift exchange and the circulation of commodities share. My view of the spirit of gift exchange owes a good deal to Bourdieu (1977), who has extended a hitherto underplayed aspect of Mauss's analysis of the gift (Mauss 1976:70-3), which stresses certain strategic parallels between gift exchange and more ostensibly "economic" tices. Bourdieu's argument, which stresses the temporal dynamics of gifting, makes a shrewd analysis of the common spirit that underlies both gift and commodity circulation: Ifit is true that the lapse oftime interposed is what enables the gift or gift to be seen and experienced as an inaugural act of generosity, without any past or i.e., without calculation, then it is clear that in reducing the polythetic to the monothetic, objectivism destroys the specificity of all practices which, like gift exchange, tend or pretend to put the law of interest into abeyance. A rational contract would telescope into an instant a transaction which gift exchange disguises, by stretching it out in time; and because of this, gift exchange is, ifnot the onlymode ofcommodity circulation practiced, at least the only mode to be fully recognized, in societies which, because they deny "the true soil of their life," as Lukacs puts it, have an economy in itself and not for itself. (Bourdieu 1977:171.) This treatment of gift exchange as a particular form of the lation of commodities comes out of Bourdieu's critique not only of "objectivist" treatments of social action, but of the sort of ism, itself a historical product of capitalism, that assumes a very stricted definition of economic interest.s Bourdieu suggests that "practice never ceases to conform to economic calculation even when it gives every appearance of disinterestedness by departing from the logic of interested calculation (in the narrow sense) and playing for stakes that are non-material and not easily quantified" (ibid: 177). I take this suggestion to converge, though from a slightly different angle, with the proposals ofTambiah (1984), Baudrillard (1968; 1975; 1981), Sahlins (1976), and Douglas and Isherwood (1981), all of which represent efforts to restore the cultural dimension to societies that are too often represented simply as economies writ large, and to restore the calculative dimension to societies that are too often simply portrayed as solidarity writ small. Part of the difficulty with a cultural analysis ofcommodities is that, as with other matters in social life, anthropology is excessively dualistic: "us and them"; "materialist religious"; "objectification of persons" versus "personification of Introduction: commodities a things"; "market exchange" versus oppositions parody both poles an cially. One symptom of this proble, conception of the commodity, as . restricting the debate to the matte is. But, in trying to understand w exchange, it does not make sense t, barter on the one hand, or from t As Simmel (1978:97-8), suggests, j dimension in all these forms of e form and intensity of sociality ass! to characterize commodity exchani manner. Let us approach commodities situation that can characterize ma ferent points in their social lives. Tl potential of all things rather than distinction between commodities means breaking significantly with t view of the commodity and focusi duction, through exchange/distrib But how are we to define the cc the commodity situation in the social situation in which its exchangeability ( thing is its socially relevant feature. defined this way, can be disaggreg of the social life of any thing; (2: thing; and (3) the commodity co placed. Each of these aspects 0 explication. The idea of the commodity ph: summary way to capture the cen portant essay in this volume, wher in and out of the commodity stat biographical approach to things i for the moment that things can r state, that such movements can be normative or deviant.4 Though th{ (such as heirlooms, postage starn! ticeable than that of some others this component is never complete The commodity candidacy of th
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