by SR Neusteter · 2019 · Cited by 19 — With this literature review of 911 studies in the context of policing and a call for more research, Vera hopes to move the field closer to identifying a
52 pages
Missing: caffeia swocta

473 KB – 52 Pages

PAGE – 2 ============
From the Director Police spend an inordinate amount of time respond -ing to 911 calls for service, even though most of these calls are unrelated to crimes in progress. Many are for quali˜-of-life issues like noise, blocked driveways, or public intoxication. Others are for problems like drug abuse, homelessness, or mental health crises that would be be˚er resolved with communi˜-based treatment or other resources ˛not a criminal justice response. But even when the underlying problem is minor or not criminal in nature, police o˝en respond to service requests with the tool that is most familiar and expedient for them to deploy: enforcement. All of this exhausts police resources and exposes countless people to avoidable criminal justice system contacts. And managing this large call volume also poses operational challenges for police agencies. ˙ere is a pressing need for data-informed strategies to identiˆ 911 calls that present a true public safe˜ emer – gency and require an immediate police response, while responding to other calls in ways that do not tax lim -ited policing resources and promote be˚er outcomes for the people involved and the communities where they reside. To do this, though, we ˇrst need to know more about how 911 and policing intersect. When is it used, how, and by whom? Why do people call 911, and what happens when they do? But the 911 system itself poses one of the greatest barriers to developing this understanding. Established only about 60 years ago, America™s emergency response system grew quickly and organically, with each call center operating independently. ˙e business of call-taking did not professionalize until decades later, and even today protocols and training for this critical link in the emergency response chain are inconsistent and frequently inadequate. And although each call center collects a vast amount of data, it is di˘cult to analyze, to compare one jurisdiction to another, or tegate information nationally. Many studies exist on medical emergency response, but relatively few focus on 911 as it relates to policing. Of those, many depend on oversimpliˇed and even outdated metrics as a way to compare data. Li˚le is known about which 911 calls received by police actually require send -ing a sworn o˘cer to the scene. A few studies, however, focus on more granular data, and those show us how that data can be used to improve policing practices while maintaining public safe˜. But much more research is needed. As the next generation of 911 call systems is rolled out nationwide, the time is ripe to identiˆ what information call-takers, responders, researchers, and policymakers need, so that we can uniˆ 911 systems and increase their e˘ciency and eectiveness. A safer, stronger, fairer justice system hinges on our abili˜ to deploy enforcement only when necessary. Developing a deep systemic understanding of 911 calls, responses, processes, outcomes, and opportunities for improvement is a key component of this process. With this literature review of 911 studies in the context of policing and a call for more research, Vera hopes to move the ˇeld closer to identiˆing a new suite of alternatives to police enforcement in emergency response situations. S. Rebecca Neusteter Policing Program Director Vera Institute of Justice

PAGE – 3 ============
Contents 1 Introduction 3 The hist ory of 911 6 The technology of emergencies 6 The call 6 Locating the emer gency 7 Intak e and processing 9 The response 11 Challenges for researchers 14 Findings from the literature 14 Studies analyzing br oad 911 metrics 26 Studies analyzing mor e granular 911 datasets 31 New options within police departments 34 Conclusion

PAGE – 4 ============
1Introduction When people think of 911, they may think ˇrst of emergency medical services. But a signiˇcant portion of the 911 calls made every year in the United States are routed to police departments. ˙ere™s only one problem: nobody knows how many. ˙e 911 system is complex and involves many actors. First there is the caller. He or she places a call for help that is connected to a call-taker. ˙e call-taker gathers information about the emergency and inputs it into a system designed to identiˆ the caller™s location and categorize the call. Next, a dispatcher (who may also be the call-taker, depending on the jurisdiction) uses this information to assign emergency responders to the location of the emergency. Once they arrive, the responders provide assis – tance. Even a˝er that, the system is still gathering data: responders are ˇlling out their own reports, comparing their assessment of the emergency to the call-taker™s, and log the amount of time spent arriving at and then responding to the emergency. With 911 systems capturing all of this information, it might seem like 911 would be easy to study, and there would exist a broad body of litera – ture analyzing pa˚erns among calls and helping police do their jobs. But 911 call centers (called public service answering points, or PSAPs) operate The development of PSAPs allowed 911 to spread rapidly through the United States, but today it is one of the greatest hindrances to actually understanding the system we use and its e˜ects.

PAGE – 5 ============
2independently and locally. ˙ey cannot transfer calls to each other and, if your call is routed to the wrong PSAP ˛for example, if you are traveling near a state line and calling from a cell phone ˛they may not be able to send responders to your emergency. ˙e development of PSAPs allowed 911 to spread rapidly through the United States, but today it is one of the greatest hindrances to actually understanding the system we use and its eects. For this report, the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) examined the body of literature that has developed as researchers have a˚empted to collect and study 911 data in the context of policing. Researchers have taken two main approaches to the study of the 911 system. First, there are studies using simpliˇed, but more readily available, metrics such as call volume, call ˜pe, and response time. ˙ese studies allow researchers to draw broad generalizations about several jurisdictions at the same time, but are limited in their abili˜ to inform about trends with any speciˇci˜ ˛they simply collapse too many variables into too few categories. ˙en there are complex studies modeling caller behavior, call ˜pe pa˚erns over time, and factors ecting the abili˜ to respond in a timely fashion. ˙ese la˚er studies demonstrate the richness of 911 data available from individual jurisdic – tions, but are limited in scope because researchers can™t compare this data across jurisdictions. ˙e report concludes with a call for research to ˇll gaps in the current 911 literature in order to chart a path forward using 911 data to improve police e˘ciency and provide the most eective and appro – priate responses to true emergencies.

PAGE – 6 ============
3˜e history of 911 In 1957, the International Association of Fire Chiefs began to lobby for a single telephone number for ˇre reporting. 1 A decade later, the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration issued a report recommending the same system for contacting police departments. 2 In 1968, AT&T ˛then the provider for most U.S. telephone service ˛designated 911 as that emer – gency number. 3 ˙e ˇrst U.S.-based 911 call was made in 1968 in Haleyville, Alabama. 4 Although it was originally envisioned as a ˇre reporting system, 911 quickly became an all-purpose emergency response system and ˛by connecting callers with police ˛one of the fastest-expanding components of the U.S. criminal justice system. 5 By the end of the 20th century, 93 percent of the country™s population ˛and 96 percent of its geographic area ˛was covered by 911 service. 6 But despite the ubiquitous nature of 911, Congress did not o˘cially adopt it as the nation™s emergency calling number until the Public Safe˜ Act of 1999. 7 ˙is may have something to do with its piecemeal growth: each jurisdiction independently developed its own 911 system ˛and only later did national-level guidelines begin to emerge. 8Today™s 911 systems bear li˚le resemblance to the rudimentary, ad hoc dispatching of the early 1970s. Technological advances have made it possible for call-takers to communicate more clearly and reliably with both callers and dispatchers. Enhanced 911 (E911, the system most people are famil -iar with today) was developed in the mid-1970s. 9 It added critical features to call-takers™ repertoires, like selective routing (responsible for making sure that 911 calls reach emergency services covering the address the call is made from), automatic caller location information, automatic telephone number identiˇcation, and call recording. 10 And public safe˜ Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems ˛a parallel policing dispatch system that enables dispatchers to assess available resources, send messages, and store data ˛which developed in the 1960s to provide support for and assist in the dispatch of patrol units, also quickly became integrated into the 911 system. 11Early 911 call-takers did not necessarily have specialized dispatch train -ing and created their own descriptions for ˇre, medical, or police services to explain the emergency. As the system aged, the business of call-taking began to professionalize, and call-takers in many locations received training

PAGE – 8 ============
5voice, photo, interactive video, and text message, addresses many of the limitations of E911, including location and accessibili˜ concerns for such populations as people who are Deaf or hard of hearing or for whom English is not their ˇrst language, as well as individuals who are in need of police assistance but a call to 911 and communication with a call-taker itself may put the caller at risk of harm. 17 As of 2017, 16 states, regions within or among states, or U.S. territories had adopted plans to implement NG911; eight had sought proposals from vendors for statewide components for a NG911 system; 11 had awarded a contract for at least one NG911 system component (such as an IP network); and 13 hallnctional NG911 system and were processing NG911 emergency calls for service. 18 But for all 911™s advantages, the system is still far from perfect. Its decentralized nature means that each of the thousands of PSAPs across the nation operates independently. 19 Some locations still do not have the ll range of E911 services, let alone NG911. 20 And, although CAD systems and AMPDS are widely used and valued tools, they are not necessarily standardized across the country ˛or even among cooperating local jurisdic -tions. 21 For example, some jurisdictions are using versions of the AMPDS database that may be out of date. And, although CAD as a system is in wide use, each locali˜ is likely to have its own set of CAD codes to convey information between dispatcher and responder.

PAGE – 9 ============
6˜e technology of emergencies To someone experiencing an emergency, 911 is designed to be simple: press three numbers, get help. But dialing these three digits sets in motion a complicated process involving several layers of technology and multiple personnel ˛and data on each decision is loed every step of the way. The callWhen a caller dials 911, she is connected to a PSAP, the call center respon -sible for responding to emergencies. 22 ˙ere are more than 6,000 PSAPs in the United States, each operating independently ˛some by state and local governments, others by law enforcement agencies, ˇre departments, and emergency management agencies. 23 Practices vary by jurisdiction in terms of whether call-takers can double as dispatchers; whether they exclusively or collectively respond to ˇre, medical, or police emergencies; and whether they are required to be certiˇed in speciˇc or general dispatch techniques. 24 (For more information about call-takers, see fi911 call-takers: ˙eir training, role, and well-beingfl on page 10.) Locating the emergency To route an emergency call to the correct PSAP, the phone company must be able to associate a phone number with a location. If a call is made from a landline, it is automatically directed to the nearest PSAP based on the address associated with the landline, and the address the phone number is registered to appears on the call-taker™s screen. 25 Calls from wireless phones, however, are more complicated. If a call is made from a cell phone, the phone™s signal is transmi˚ed to the nearest cell phone tower, and that signal is then transmi˚ed to the finearestfl PSAP. 26 ˙is can cause prob -lems when a call is made near a jurisdictional border, because the nearest cell tower may route to a PSAP that does not serve the caller™s location. 27 Because PSAPs are not necessarily networked, this can mean signiˇcant

PAGE – 10 ============
7delays in ˛or even failure to provide ˛service. 28 ˙is is a rapidly growing and signiˇcant problem. In 2016, approximately 80 percent of 911 calls came from cell phones. 29Moreover, cell phones do not remain in a ˇxed location and providers do not necessarily release location data for these phones. 30 In PSAPs with E911 service, the cellular provider is required to transmit the phone number and at least the location of the cell tower to which the call connected, as well as location data that includes the latitude and longitude from which the call was made (accurate to within 50 to 300 meters), depending on which E911 features have been implemented in that region. 31 ˙is enables PSAPs to follow-up on abandoned cell phone calls and ensure that there is no emer – gency, where before they would have been unable to dispatch services. As noted above, in 2016, 80 percent of 911 calls came from cell phones. 32 But voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) calls are accounting for an increasing share of 911 calls. 33 VOIP calls, because they come through an Internet service provider, also may not be associated with an address. One reason for the number of VOIP calls is that businesses and homeowners have begun bundling phone and Internet services together. Another is that a cell phone will make a VOIP call if it is connected via Wi-Fi to a network, rather than using cellular network data. 34 VOIP calls pose a unique challenge to PSAPs that may not be resolved until NG911 lly implemented. As an additional failsafe, 911 call-takers in many jurisdictions have begun asking fiwhere is your emergency?fl as their ˇrst question, rather than fiwhat is your emergency?fl 35 (For an overview of the 911 process, see Figure 1, below.) Intake and processing Assuming the caller has not abandoned the call, the call-taker will ask a series of questions dictated by the PSAP™s protocols, which ˛like most processes related to 911 ˛vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 36 ˙ese ques -tions are designed to triage the emergency, identiˆ appropriate services, and give the emergency service providers ˛whether medical, ˇre, or police ˛the information they need to respond. At this point, the call itself is o˝en being recorded and both the information provided by the caller and the call-taker™s responses can be reviewed later by supervisors or researchers. 37

PAGE – 11 ============
8˙e National Emergency Number Association (NENA), a professional organization for 911 providers, recommends that, at minimum, the follow -ing information should be gathered by call-takers: łthe address or exact location of the incident; ła call-back number; łthe ˜pe of emergency; łthe time of occurrence; łany known hazards; and łthe identities of those involved and their location. 38As call-takers process calls, they will either transfer them to a specialized dispatcher or perform dispatch services. ˙is requires decision making on the part of call-takers. Do they send only medical services to an accident? Medical and police? How many responders are required? Dispatchers Figure 1 How the 911 system works: From call to response Source: Adapted from Evan Mason, fi9-1-1 System,fl via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution- Share Alike 3.0 Unported license. ˜˚˛˝˙˚ˆ˝ˇ ANI ˝˝ ALI ˜˚˛ ˜ • ˝ˇ •˝˛ ˚ ˝

473 KB – 52 Pages